It is generally accepted that, in the cognitive and neural sciences, there are both computational and mechanistic explanations. We ask how computational explanations can integrate into the mechanistic hierarchy. The problem stems from the fact that implementation and mechanistic relations have different forms. The implementation relation, from the states of an abstract computational system (e.g., an automaton) to the physical, implementing states is a homomorphism mapping relation. The mechanistic relation, however, is that of part/whole; the explaining features in a mechanistic explanation are the components of the explanandum phenomenon and their causal organization. Moreover, each component in one level of mechanism is constituted and explained by components of an underlying level of mechanism. Hence, it seems, computational variables and functions cannot be mechanistically explained by the medium-dependent states and properties that implement them. How then, do the computational and the implementational integrate to create the mechanistic hierarchy? After explicating the general problem (Sect. 2), we further demonstrate it through a concrete example, of reinforcement learning, in the cognitive and neural sciences (Sects. 3 and 4). We then examine two possible solutions (Sect. 5). On one solution, the mechanistic hierarchy embeds at the same levels computational and implementational properties. This picture fits with the view that computational explanations are mechanistic sketches. On the other solution, there are two separate hierarchies, one computational and another implementational, which are related by the implementation relation. This picture fits with the view that computational explanations are functional and autonomous explanations. It is less clear how these solutions fit with the view that computational explanations are full-fledged mechanistic explanations. Finally, we argue that both pictures are consistent with the reinforcement learning example, B Lotem Elber-Dorozko lotem.elber@mail.huji.ac.il Extended author information available on the last page of the article 123 Synthese but that scientific practice does not align with the view that computational models are merely mechanistic sketches (Sect. 6).
mapping relation, so that each distinct computational state is mapped onto a distinct physical state. The mechanistic relation, however, is that of part/whole; the explaining properties in a mechanistic explanation are components of the explanandum phenomenon and their causal organization. Moreover, each component in one level of mechanism is constituted and explained by components of another, underlying, level of mechanism. Hence, it seems, computational states are implemented in some physical structures, but they do not stand in part/whole relations to them and therefore they cannot be mechanistically explained by the same structures. So, the question is: How do computational states and properties integrate with implementational states and properties to form the mechanistic hierarchy? 2 Before turning to address this question, we want to describe the main features of mechanistic and computational explanations. Mechanistic explanations have three main features: they are causal, decompositional and hierarchical. They are causal in that they explain phenomena by describing their underlying mechanism. Consider the reflex that is responsible for keeping the direction of gaze constant when the head is rotated horizontally. It is called the horizontal vestibulo-ocular reflex. Its function is explained by reference to an underlying mechanism whose inputs are the effects of head movements on the vestibular organ and whose outputs are given to the ocular muscles. Within the mechanism there are feedforward inhibitory and excitatory synaptic connections, so that each pre-synaptic neuron causally affects the post-synaptic neurons (Kandel et al. 2013, Chapter 40) . Mechanistic explanations are decompositional because the explanandum phenomenon is explained in terms of its components, their organization and their activities (functions). In our example the constant gaze when the head is rotated is explained by appeal to the neurons' change in firing rate in response to synaptic inputs (the components and their activities), as well as the specific synaptic connections between neurons (the organization). Finally, mechanistic explanations are hierarchical: each explaining component in one level is itself the explanandum for another level of mechanism. Accordingly, the release of neurotransmitter to the synapse by the pre-synaptic neuron, is also explained mechanistically (see Piccinini and Craver 2011) . Our focus here is the third feature of mechanistic explanations, namely, the mechanistic hierarchy. An important point about the hierarchy is that each level in the hierarchy is a mechanistic explanation.
Computational explanations are taken to be abstract in that they refer to abstract, "medium-independent", properties (see ft. 2). This claim is fairly uncontroversial. 3 What perhaps is more controversial is the claim that computational explanations refer 2 Computational, medium-independent, entities can include phenomena, capacities, states, properties, functions, operations, variables and so on. Medium-dependent entities can include the same types (though our account is also consistent with the view that the abstract/medium-dependent characterization does not pertain to the phenomena themselves but rather to their descriptions). We will usually refer to only one of these entities, but the account applies to the others as well. The term component will be used in the context of part/whole relation: A component is an essential part (but not necessarily a spatial one) of a phenomenon. 3 There are, however, different ways to account for the nature of these "medium-independent" properties. Fodor (1975) and Stich (1983) describe them as "syntactic" properties, and Fodor (1994) accounts for the latter in terms of high-level physical properties. Haugeland (1981) describes them as "formal" (see also Fodor 1980) . Piccinini (2015) describes computational properties as "mathematical" or "formal", and others have suggested that, regarding computations, the relevant physical properties of the implementing physical systems are only their degrees of freedom (Coelho Mollo 2018; Piccinini and Bahar 2013). only to abstract, formal properties. Some authors argue that computational explanations also refer to semantic properties, namely to the specific content of the states (Shagrir 2006; Sprevak 2010) ; others might insist that computational explanations also refer to some implementational, medium-dependent, properties [Some of the writings of Dewhurst (2018) and Kaplan (2011 Kaplan ( , 2017 ) may be interpreted this way]. We will not get into the debate about the nature of physical computation. Our concern is with the integration of abstract computational properties into the mechanistic hierarchy. 4 We take abstract here to mean "medium-independent" in the sense that they can be implemented in very different physical media (e.g., both in brains and in computers). We will refer to these abstract properties as computational. But by this we assume in no way that computational properties are only abstract.
The issues discussed here may seem to fall squarely within the debate about the metaphysics of the realization relation. The part/whole mechanistic relation seems more fitting with the Gillett-style dimensioned account of realization (Gillett 2002 (Gillett , 2016 . The implementation-of-computation-in-physical-system relation seems more fitting with the Shoemaker-style subset "standard" account (Kim 1998; Shoemaker 2001) . But the questions we ask here are very different from the ones that are at the center of the metaphysical debate. The metaphysical debate is about which relation better describes the realization relation. We are not concerned with this debate. We do not assume that the part/whole mechanistic relation is a realization relation. We also do not assume that the implementation relation, which is often considered as a realization relation between a computation and a physical system, is indicative of other kinds of realization relations. In fact, we take it for granted that each of the two relations-the part/whole mechanistic relation and the mapping implementation relation-plays a role in the cognitive and neural sciences. Our question is whether and how we can integrate them within the mechanistic hierarchy. Last but not least, the metaphysical debate often focuses on the question of whether or not the realized properties have causal powers (or relevance) above and beyond the powers of the realizing properties. This paper does not address this issue, at least explicitly. Obviously, these metaphysical issues have some affinities with the questions discussed here. But we prefer to keep the discussion apart at this point. For this reason, and to avoid confusion with the metaphysical debate, we will use here only the term implementation and will seldom mention realization.
The computational and implementational hierarchies
Let us turn to the problem of integrating computational states and properties into the mechanistic hierarchy. As a warm-up, let us look at the way Piccinini describes this integration. Piccinini (2015) , who defends the view that computational explanations are mechanistic, takes those computational levels to be levels of mechanism. In a crucial paragraph in his book he says the following:
The mechanistic account flows naturally from these theses. Computing systems, such as calculators and computers, consist of component parts (processors, memory units, input devices, and output devices), their functions, and their organization. Those components also consist of component parts (e.g., registers and circuits), their functions, and their organization. Those, in turn, consist of primitive computing components (paradigmatically, logic gates), their functions, and their organization. Primitive computing components can be further analyzed mechanistically but not computationally (2015, pp. 118-119) . Now, we think that it is uncontroversial that Piccinini describes here levels of computation that relate to each other in a part/whole relation. As Piccinini depicts it, computers consist of processors, memory etc., which in turn consist of registers and circuits, which in turn consist of logic gates (Fig. 1) .
However, Piccinini does make a controversial claim, namely that computational explanations are mechanistic. This claim has been criticized on three main grounds.
Some critics argue that, even if some computational explanations are decompositional as in the described case, there are other cases in which computational explanations do not decompose the explananda into components, but instead refer to general structural or topological properties of the system, and so are not mechanistic (Huneman 2010; Rathkopf 2015) (but see Craver 2016) . A second criticism is that computational explanations do not always aim to reveal causal structures. Egan (2017) suggests that computational models are explanatory because they are abstract and normative. Chirimuuta (2014) suggests that some computational models explain why a computation takes place by appeal to efficient coding principles, and Bechtel and Shagrir (Bechtel and Shagrir 2015; Shagrir and Bechtel 2017) suggest that some computational models also explain the existence of a computation by appeal to environmental constraints in ways that do not reveal causal structures [which is not to say that mechanistic explanations cannot appeal to environmental factors (Bechtel 2009)] . According to the two criticisms presented above, computational explanations are not wholly mechanistic, but it still may be that some computational explanations, which refer to mediumindependent properties, are decompositional, and therefore may be mechanistic.
Other critics argue that, even when computational explanations involve decomposition, the resulting levels of computation are not levels of mechanisms. Instead, they argue that these levels are functional; they are part of a functional analysis which explains the capacity (Cummins 1983 (Cummins , 2000 Fodor 1968 ). These critics would agree that the levels are decompositional, relating to each other in a part/whole fashion, which is perfectly consistent with the functional account of computational explanations. They would also agree that the pertinent computational properties are "medium-independent", at least in the sense that they refer to abstract and not to medium-dependent, implementational, properties. The critics would argue, however, that the divide between the abstract (medium-independent) properties and implementational properties is indicative of the divide between functional and mechanistic explanations (Shapiro 2017; Weiskopf 2011) . Because functional and implementational entities are inherently different, computational and mechanistic explanations take place in different levels of explanation. Piccinini (2015) in turn rejects the functional/mechanistic distinction, arguing that functional explanations are sketches of mechanism (Piccinini and Craver 2011) . Moreover, he argues that computational explanations are (ideally) both abstract and full-fledged mechanistic. They are abstract in the sense that they refer to medium-independent properties. They are mechanistic in the sense that the medium-independent properties constrain the implementation [Piccinini (2015) ; but see Shapiro (2017) for criticism].
We put aside the question of whether the computational level-as a level of abstract, medium-independent, properties-sufficiently constrains implementation to be considered mechanistic. We want to highlight a different issue that Piccinini and others do not discuss, namely, the way that computational (medium-independent) and implementational (medium-dependent) states and properties relate to each other in the mechanistic hierarchy.
The picture depicted by Piccinini raises two (related) issues. The first pertains to the primitive computing components. Piccinini says that "primitive computing components can be further analyzed mechanistically but not computationally". He means that we can further analyze the logic gates in terms of non-computational, medium-dependent properties. The difficulty is that the logic gates are also implemented in some medium-dependent properties. The inputs and outputs of logic gates-typically characterized as 1s and 0s-are often implemented in systems with specific voltages. The implementing physical objects with specific voltages, however, are not parts of the digits. More generally, implementation is often characterized as a mapping homomorphism relation from the states of an abstract computing system (e.g., an automaton) to groups of states of a physical system. For example, there is a mapping from the digits 0 and 1 to the sets of voltages, 0-5 V and 5-10 V. The sets of voltages, however, are not themselves the mechanism that constitute the digits. The question raised, then, is about the relations between the medium-independent properties that analyze computation in the mechanistic explanation and the medium-dependent properties that implement computation. The first ones, the analyzing properties, seem to be parts of the digits, whereas the second ones, the implementing properties, are not. Are these the same properties and how do they relate to each other? We expect a part-whole mechanistic analysis, but we can only find at this stage an implementation-relation and not a part/whole-relation, so how can logic gates be explained mechanistically?
A second issue concerns the non-primitive computing components. The components of a higher-level computation are analyzed by an underlying computational level. But they are also implemented in some medium-dependent properties. How are these underlying properties-the computational and implementational-related? Take the computational level that consists of "component parts (e.g., registers and circuits), their function, and their organization". Let us call it C n . The components of C n can be analyzed, computationally, by the computational components of an underlying computational level C n−1 (e.g., logic gates). However, the computational components of C n are also implemented in some medium-dependent properties that belong to some mechanistic level, P k . But how are P k and C n−1 related in the mechanistic hierarchy? Moreover, P k itself is part of a hierarchy, P 0 , P 1 , P 2 ,… So, there are two hierarchies, one computational, C 1 , C 2 ,… and one implementational, P 0 , P 1 , P 2 ,… (Fig. 2) .
Several issues are worthwhile addressing regarding this picture. First, in some cases computational explanations are not decompositional (Bechtel and Shagrir 2015; Chirimuuta 2014; Egan 2017; Huneman 2010; Rathkopf 2015; Shagrir and Bechtel 2017) , and therefore are not hierarchical. Although in such cases we will not find two or more hierarchies, the question of how the single-level computational explanation is integrated into the implementational hierarchy persists.
We would also like to note that much of the structure of these two hierarchies and their relations depends on how one defines 'a level of explanation'. There is practically unanimous agreement that in the scientific investigation of cognitive capacities both the underlying computation and the underlying implementation should be addressed eventually. The question that is under debate addresses the relevant details for a complete explanation of a phenomenon at a specific level. According to the mechanistic framework, a complete explanation at each level will include all the causally relevant relations and activities that constitute the explanandum phenomenon.
Our question then is how the computational, medium-independent, states and properties and their implementational, medium-dependent, states and properties relate to 
A hierarchical computational model for reinforcement learning
It could be argued that the two hierarchies we describe in the decomposition of the computer are the result of a specific man-made design, and that the observations from a computer cannot be generalized to the cognitive sciences. For this reason, it is useful to examine the relation between computation and implementation in the mechanistic hierarchy with the help of an example from the cognitive and neural sciences.
Reinforcement learning is a behavior in which the subject learns to choose specific actions according to their consequences, with the goal of maximizing rewards. It is widely investigated; it has received attention both from computer scientists who have suggested algorithms for action selection that maximize specific outcomes (Sutton and Barto 1998) , and from neural and cognitive scientists who have compared various reinforcement learning models with subjects' behaviors (Mongillo et al. 2014; Shteingart and Loewenstein 2014) and searched for neural correlates of variables from reinforcement learning algorithms (Li and Daw 2011; Samejima et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2013) .
Reinforcement learning is a process that requires multiple different computations, and as such it can be viewed hierarchically. At the highest level, reinforcement learning can be divided into four main processes, each involving its own computations: recognizing the subject's state, evaluating potential actions, selecting an action, and reevaluating the action based on the outcome (Doya 2008) .
Each one of these processes has been discussed in large bodies of literature and can be further decomposed in various ways. To provide more concrete examples, we will discuss reinforcement learning in the context of a multi-armed bandit task, where there is only one state in which the subject repeatedly chooses between multiple actions, each associated with a certain magnitude or probability of reward. We describe here a simple and widely used algorithm for reinforcement learning, which is called Qlearning (because the values associated with the actions are called Q-values) (Sutton and Barto 1998; Watkins and Dayan 1992) . In a multi-armed bandit task, reinforcement learning has two main modules (instead of the four we originally mentioned), action reevaluation and action selection.
Consider the module which is responsible for reevaluating an action after an outcome. In Q-learning, each Q-value is meant to reflect the expected reward associated with each action, also called the action-value. In order to learn this action-value, after each trial a variable called the reward prediction error (RPE) is computed. The RPE is the difference between the reward that was just received and the current value of the chosen action:
Footnote 5 continued the computational function, and in the second it is the medium-dependent function (which may or may not coincide with the computational function).
where R(t) is the reward given at time t, a i is action i and V i (t) is the action-value of action i at time t. Then, the value of the chosen action is updated by summing the previous value with a magnitude that is proportional to the RPE. Written formally:
where α is a parameter that indicates the learning rate-the larger α is, the more weight recent trials are given at the expense of previous trials.
If we wish, we can continue this hierarchical computational explanation, by explaining how the components in Eqs. (1)- (2) are computed. For example, we can explain how the learning rate 'α' is computed. We can also explain how the reward is evaluated, or what the initial conditions set for V i (t 0) are. 6 Consider now the second module, the module that is responsible for selecting between different actions. The simplest module would just select the action that has the highest value, according to the computation in Eq. (2). However, this method may never sample actions that initially received lower values, even in cases where these lower values were underestimates of the current true values. Therefore, it is generally agreed that some form of exploration is required, i.e., actions with lower values should be chosen with a non-zero probability. A common model that incorporates exploration into the choice is a 'softmax' function where actions with higher values have a higher probability to be chosen. The 'softmax' function is:
where a i (t) is action i at time t, P(a i (t)) is the probability of choosing action i at time t, V i (t) is the action-value of action i at time t, n is the number of possible actions, and β is a parameter that determines the bias of the choice towards the higher valued actions. The components of this action selection function can also be further explained. For example, in this equation, the choice is stochastic. We can also provide a model for this stochasticity. Or we can explain the choice of β, which may be a constant, or change throughout learning. Figure 3 presents a summary of the hierarchical model we described so far. Using the two modules described above, in a multi-armed bandit task, where subjects choose between several actions repeatedly, it is possible to learn to choose the action that is associated with the largest reward most frequently. Hence, a popular theory in the cognitive sciences is that people employ a model similar to Q-learning in various instances of reinforcement learning. Q-learning is not the only model that has been suggested for reinforcement learning. It has a few competitors at several different levels. First, some reinforcement learning algorithms do not compute the values of actions at all. Instead, learning is done directly on the 'policy': the probability of choosing each action. These are called direct-policy learning algorithms (Mongillo et al. 2014; Shteingart and Loewenstein 2014) . Second, in the Q-learning model the action selection function (Eq. 3) utilizes the same action-values as the action reevaluation function (Eq. 2). However, in some reinforcement learning algorithms, the action selection function does not employ the action-value estimates of the action reevaluation function. Instead, the only signal the action-selection function receives from the action-reevaluation function is the RPE. In these algorithms these two modules are also called the 'actor' and the 'critic', respectively (Sutton and Barto 1998) . A third issue concerns the complexity of Q-learning. It is argued that it is too simple to explain a wide variety of behaviors and therefore this original model has been developed into alternative, more complicated models (Botvinick 2012; Botvinick et al. 2009 ). Each of these three groups of competing models challenges a different level in the hierarchical computational model of Qlearning. The first group of models challenges whether there is an action reevaluation function at all, the second group of models questions the relation between the action selection and the action reevaluation functions and the third presents alternatives to the structure within each function.
We described how each function in the Q-learning model can be analyzed by appeal to the sub-functions that compose it. We take this as an indication that the Q-learning model is decompositional and even hierarchical. 7 Furthermore, all properties discussed in the Q-learning model are medium-independent: they do not necessitate a specific physical structure. In fact, they are abstract enough that they can be both implemented in computers and, as many scientists hypothesize, in brains (Doya 2000 (Doya , 2008 O'Doherty et al. 2004; Samejima et al. 2005; Schultz et al. 1997 ).
The computational and implementational hierarchies of reinforcement learning
A great deal of scientific research has been dedicated to the characterization of the neural correlates of the Q-learning model (Doya 2000 (Doya , 2008 Hollerman and Schultz 1998; Ito and Doya 2009; Kable and Glimcher 2009; Samejima et al. 2005; Tai et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2013) . Experimental evidence has implicated the basal ganglia, a group of several subcortical nuclei, including the striatum, pallidum and substantia nigra, in decision making, and specifically in the context of reinforcement learning (Doya 2000) . With regard to the different modules of reinforcement learning, the coding of state and possible actions in each state has been attributed to the cortex, the calculation of the expected reward associated with each action (action reevaluation) has been attributed to the striatum, action selection has been attributed to the pallidum, etc. In Fig. 4 you can see a scientific hypothetical model which describes the implementation of the computational modules employed in reinforcement learning. The attribution of specific computational properties to specific brain areas corresponds to their connectivity patterns. On the Q-learning model we expect action-values to play a part in the action selection function (Eq. 3). On our implementational model striatal neurons represent action-values and pallidal neurons are responsible for action selection. Indeed, in line with the computational model, we see that striatal neurons target and causally affect pallidal neurons. Hence, on this description, abstract computational relations are translated into causal relations between physical brain areas. 8 One can wonder about the model on the right-hand side of Fig. 4 . While the model on the left-hand side clearly describes causal relations between brain areas, the model on the right-hand side is abstract and is termed functional by Doya (2008) . Although its Fig 2) . Legend is taken from the original paper drawing is abstract, this model is committed to specific brain areas, sometimes describing brain areas without an apparent function (such as the Thalamus). For this reason, it would be difficult to consider this model a functional analysis [described by Cummins (1983 Cummins ( , 2000 and Fodor (1968) ]. Furthermore, this model is committed to specific media, namely, brain areas, and therefore it does not describe medium-independent properties. For this reason, we consider it an implementational model. However, for those who believe that computational models are both complete mechanistic explanations and medium-independent (Piccinini 2015) , this model, which focuses on the abstract functions of specific brain areas, may be similar to what they have in mind. 9 The components in the implementation described in Fig. 4 can be decomposed themselves into subparts, which correspond to parts of the computations. For example, there is experimental evidence that midbrain dopaminergic neurons that provide input to striatal neurons (note the arrow from the gray box to the red box in Fig. 4) , encode the reward prediction error (RPE) (Eq. 1), which is a component in the calculation of action-values (Eq. 2) (Hollerman and Schultz 1998; Schultz et al. 1997) . To provide another example, neurons in both the ventral and dorsal striatum receive inputs from midbrain dopamine neurons, which are taken to encode the RPE. Therefore, both are taken to play a role in reward prediction. Nonetheless, experimental findings have suggested that neuronal activity in the striatum can be divided into two anatomically and functionally separate parts that play different roles in reward prediction: the dorsal Fig 2) . Reprinted with permission from Elsevier striatum plays a role in associating stimuli with responses, corresponding primarily to an 'actor' (action selection) module, while the ventral striatum plays a role in updating the predictions of future rewards expected in each state, corresponding to a 'critic' (action reevaluation) module (O'Doherty et al. 2004) .
We see in this reinforcement-learning example two distinct hierarchies, one computational and one implementational. Part of the computational hierarchy can be seen in Fig. 3 . This hierarchy is abstract, medium-independent and can be discussed without mention of any brain structures. We can also see an implementational hierarchy, part of it is depicted in Fig. 4 , where brain structures are decomposed into functionally and anatomically individuated components. In some scientific publications we can even see computational and implementational models for reinforcement learning (albeit slightly different models from the Q-learning model) depicted side by side, as in Fig. 5 .
The relation between these two hierarchies is that of implementation, throughout the scientific literature brain structures are described as 'implementing' (Ito and Doya 2011) , 'realizing' (Doya 2008) , 'representing' (Samejima et al. 2005) and 'encoding' (Schultz et al. 1997 ) computational properties.
The relation between the computational and implementational hierarchies
We found in our scientific example two hierarchies, like the ones described in Fig. 2 . However, there are still many open questions about these hierarchies, both in general and in our example. How do these hierarchies relate to each other within the scientific explanation? How does this relation reflect the explanatory role of the computational and implementational models? Finally, what role do implementation relations and part/whole relations play in the explanation of cognitive phenomena? In this section, we suggest possible answers to these questions and investigate their merit. We relate these possible answers to the different views about abstractness and completeness of computational models. We do not aim to support one stance on this question, but instead wish to examine the consequence of the different positions about computational models as explanations and start a debate about these possible solutions. We can think of two ways to relate computation and implementation to each other within the mechanistic hierarchy. One is lumping together the implementational and the abstract properties in each level, namely C 1 and P 1 , C 2 and P 2 and so on. Figure 6 shows an example of this picture on the decomposition of a computer.
On this picture we do not have two separate hierarchies, but only one: The pertinent computational properties are lumped together with their implementational properties in the same level(s) of explanation [a similar structure of explanation is presented in (Harbecke, under review) ]. This simple solution implies that computational and implementational properties figure together in the same explanation and in the same levels of the mechanistic hierarchy. This solution is in tension with the view that computational explanations are autonomous from implementation and therefore do not require implementation details, but fits quite nicely with the picture on which computational explanations are sketches of mechanisms [some people, e.g., Rusanen and Lappi (2016), Shagrir (2016) interpret Kaplan and Craver (2011) , Piccinini and Craver (2011) as advocates of this position]. On this picture, the computational sketches turn into a full-fledged mechanistic explanation only when we complement the sketches with the same-level implementational properties. When both kinds of properties are mentioned then we have a full-fledged mechanistic explanation, hence a level of mechanism. The mechanistic hierarchy simply embeds within it, a subhierarchy of computational sketches.
We can see two possible upshots of this construal, depending on one's view of computational models as sketches. One may consider computational sketches to simply be partial descriptions of the implementational model and computational properties to simply be abstract facets of the implementing properties, stripped away from their medium-dependent aspects. On this formulation, when the implementing properties are described in an explanation, the computational properties, which are merely a partial aspect of the implementational properties, become redundant. We are left with an implementational hierarchy, partial descriptions of which are computational models. On such a view it is clear how there is only one mechanistic hierarchy-an implementational hierarchy. However, this view completely dismisses any explanatory value of computational descriptions that goes above implementational descriptions. Some may argue-and this is the conclusion that we reach in Sect. 6 as well-that this view is inconsistent with scientific practice, which often appeals to computational explanations as more than partial implementational descriptions (Haimovici 2013) . Alternatively, one may believe that computational sketches can include abstract details and aspects that are not made redundant when we add the implementational details. Therefore, in the complete model both computational and implementational properties figure together. This view takes computational properties to be more than partial implementational descriptions, but it brings up the original problem discussed in this A second option is to keep the two hierarchies apart (Fig. 7) . The two hierarchies are related through the implementation relation. The computational properties of C 1 are mapped (implemented by) to the implementational properties of P 1 , the computational properties of C 2 are mapped to the implementational properties of P 2 , and so on. While objects by the same name may appear in both hierarchies, such as CPUs and registers in Fig. 7 , the computational hierarchy includes only abstract, mediumindependent properties (e.g., digits in logic gates) and the implementational hierarchy includes physical, medium-dependent properties (e.g., voltages and electric circuits). Figure 7 presents a simple case where each computational level is mapped to each implementational level. In reality there might not be a perfect match between the hierarchies and computational properties at the same level may be implemented in implementational properties in different levels. Whatever the structure of the implementation relation, in all cases in this picture there are two hierarchies so that each level in each hierarchy is a complete explanation of the phenomenon at the higher level and the computational properties in the computational hierarchy are implemented by implementational properties in the implementational hierarchy. This solution is more hospitable to the notion that there is multiple realization of cognitive functions, since the same computational hierarchy can be related to (i.e., implemented in) different implementational hierarchies.
This picture also fits quite nicely with the functional view of explanation, namely, the idea that computational explanations are full-fledged functional (yet non-mechanistic) explanations. According to this functional picture, computational explanations are distinct and autonomous from mechanistic explanations (Cummins 1983; Fodor 1968) , which fits with the solution in which the two hierarchies are distinct. Computational and implementational properties do not figure together in the decompositional explanation of the same capacities. Instead, only computational properties are part of the decomposition of computations. Implementational properties can still figure in explanations of computations, but these explanations will not be mechanistic because there is no part/whole relation between the explaining properties and the explanandum. While on this picture the two hierarchies are separate, they still constrain each other: the relevant implementational properties are determined according to the computational function, and the computational hierarchy must be one which can be implemented in the physical system. Despite these mutual constraints, those supporting this picture will argue that the computation performed as part of some cognitive capacity can be given a complete explanation at one level without any reference to implementation and that the implementation details explain a different aspect of this capacity, namely, how the capacity is implemented. That is, computational and implementational explanations answer different questions.
On both pictures, primitive computing processes are analyzed mechanistically, if at all, only indirectly. The primitive computational components, e.g., logic gates, are implemented in some implementational properties, e.g., voltages, whereas only the latter can be further analyzed mechanistically. On the combined-hierarchy picture (Fig. 6) , the computational properties will figure together with implementational properties in each level, until at some point the primitive computing processes can no longer be decomposed, and only implementational properties will continue to be decomposed (Fig. 7) , the computational hierarchy will terminate at the primitive computing components.
On both pictures, the implementation is not a part/whole relation and therefore the description of implementation cannot be taken as a mechanistic explanation. Nonetheless, these two pictures do differ in how they view the role of implementation in explanation in general. On the combined picture, both computational and implementational details figure together in one mechanistic hierarchy. Therefore, it is natural to take relations of implementation to not have an explanatory role. Instead, medium-dependent details are taken to explain by decomposition of the phenom-ena. On the separate-hierarchies picture implementation can be considered to have a non-mechanistic explanatory role: it explains how the explanandum, as well as the computational hierarchy are implemented (see Coelho Mollo 2018) .
What about the view that computational explanations are both abstract and fullfledged mechanistic explanations? It would be difficult to see how the first solution in Fig. 6 can be consistent with it. If computational explanations are complete mechanistic explanations, why do they require additional implementation details in the same mechanistic level of explanation? The second solution in Fig. 7 is not necessarily inconsistent with this view. For example, if one takes computational states and properties to have causal powers, then one can view the computational hierarchy as a hierarchy of complete mechanistic explanations. However, on this view the role of the implementational hierarchy still needs to be explicated. A possible implication is that the overall mechanistic picture is more complex: We have different mechanistic hierarchies that apply to different properties of the same objects/components. But under this picture any computational capacity has at least two hierarchical explanations, and it is not obvious which one of them should be considered the mechanistic explanation. A possible way to elucidate this complex picture is to maintain that the implementational hierarchy explains how the computational hierarchy is implemented, rather than how the cognitive capacity is performed. On this view, the computational hierarchy is the mechanistic hierarchy which decomposes the cognitive capacity and the implementational hierarchy is an appendix which explains the implementation of the computation (Coelho Mollo 2018).
Some insights from reinforcement learning
It can be useful to examine the relation between the hierarchies in reinforcement learning. When considering the computational and implementational hierarchical models for reinforcement learning, which solution best describes the relation between these hierarchies? We believe that evidence in this case is mixed and can support both suggested solutions for the relation between the hierarchies. On the picture seen on Fig. 6 , each level combines computation and implementation into one mechanistic explanation. Therefore, we would expect the scientific investigation of lower levels to include a physical decomposition of the higher level, as occurs in mechanistic explanations. However, in our example the scientific investigation of the implementation of the computational hierarchy searches for the implementation of variables at various levels of this hierarchy, such as the representations of action-value (Samejima et al. 2005) , RPE (Schultz et al. 1997 ) and learning rate (α in Eq. 1) (Behrens et al. 2007 ). Often, the search for a lower-level variable such as the learning rate takes place in the absence of a scientifically supported neural correlate for the higher-level computational variable of which it consists (In this case the calculation of action-value). Hence, the search for neural correlates here is more akin to the search for relations between two separate computational and implementational hierarchies than to the physical decomposition of mechanisms.
Moreover, scientific investigation of both hierarchies can and has been conducted separately. The Q-learning algorithm for reinforcement learning has been investigated both analytically (Watkins and Dayan 1992) and behaviorally (Shteingart et al. 2013) . These methods ignore the neural correlates of this model. Similarly, the basal ganglia have been investigated anatomically and functionally without addressing computational models for reinforcement learning (Hoshi et al. 2005) . This suggests that a framework of two hierarchies, as presented in Fig. 7 , is the appropriate one in this case.
On the other hand, it can be argued that current scientific research is still preliminary and not indicative of the final form of a fully-fledged scientific explanation. Hints that such a form will include one combined mechanistic hierarchy can be found in the fact that scientific debates today about the plausibility of specific computational models of reinforcement learning often also appeal to the plausibility of the implementation of these models (Botvinick et al. 2009 ).
Moreover, findings of implementation of specific computational variables can be used to support or refute abstract computational models. Recall the three challenges to the Q-learning model we presented in Sect. 3. The first one suggested that instead of learning the values of the actions, there is 'direct-policy' learning where the probability of choosing each action (i.e., the policy) is reevaluated at each step. There is an ongoing scientific debate about the representation of action-values and policy signals in the brain. Whether such signals are indeed represented in the brain is taken to have implications on which of the models is the correct computational model (ElberDorozko and Loewenstein 2018; Li and Daw 2011; Samejima et al. 2005) . To further illustrate, the finding in (O'Doherty et al. 2004 ) that striatal neurons can be divided into 'actor' and 'critic' modules is relevant to the second challenge: whether the action selection and action reevaluation modules can be separated into 'actor' and 'critic'.
It is also increasingly popular to suggest computational models that are informed by the structure of neural networks, with the purpose of suggesting models that are more biologically plausible (Mnih et al. 2016) . Even though physical structures are used as evidence in this debate, the questions pertain to the architecture of the abstract computational model, which can be implemented both in computers and in brains.
Given these examples it can be argued that the practice of developing a complete explanation at each level of the explanatory hierarchy involves a close and reciprocal relation between the computational models and their possible implementation, and that computational models are not considered explanations until they have been shown to be implemented in the brain. This suggests that computation and implementation belong together in one level of the explanation. Therefore, the pictures presented in Figs. 6 and 7 are both still possible regarding this example.
However, when considering whether computational descriptions are merely sketches of mechanisms, on the interpretation of sketches as partial descriptions of implementation, the evidence is more conclusive. We see that, in our example of reinforcement learning, evidence from scientific practice is strongly against the view of computational models as sketches. Moreover, scientific practice tends to take implementational details to explain the implementation of the computational model rather than the cognitive capacity directly. Often, when findings of neural correlates of variables from reinforcement learning models are reported, they are reported as discoveries about the implementation of these models. Hence, such findings are taken to answer questions about how, and whether a specific computational model is implemented in the brain and they do not attempt to explain reinforcement learning (or decision making in general) without appeal to some computational model. Perhaps the strongest indication for this is in experiments where there is some causal intervention on brain areas and behavioral changes are measured. If computational models are merely partial descriptions of implementation, they will be unnecessary in the interpretation of causal experiments, where the causal structure is already described in the results of the experiment. However, often, results in such experiments are interpreted in the framework of a computational model of reinforcement learning (Lee et al. 2015; Tai et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2013 ). For example, Tai et al. (2012) find that stimulation of striatal neurons causes a bias in choices, and they interpret these results by saying that stimulation of striatal neurons mimics changes in action-value. Hence, instead of utilizing the causal finding to explain the behavior of the subjects directly, Tai et al. (2012) use their finding in the framework of the Q-learning model to describe the effects of their intervention on a computational variable. Such a computational interpretation to causal results is difficult to explain if computational models are taken to be merely partial descriptions of causal mechanisms and is much more in line with the view that computational models have a unique explanatory value. Moreover, this scientific practice can be taken to support the claim that implementational details are taken to explain the computational model rather than the cognitive capacity itself.
For this reason, we believe that our example does not support the view that computational models are partial descriptions or that computational models are explanatory only because they describe causal relations. Instead, this reinforcement learning example is more consistent with the view that computational properties play an invaluable role in the explanation of cognitive phenomena.
Nonetheless, reinforcement learning is just one example of computational models of cognitive capacities. Future investigation of other computational models will be telling regarding the relation between computation and implementation.
Summary
After raising the problem of how computational explanations integrate into the mechanistic hierarchy, we analyzed reinforcement learning as an example of a computational model in the cognitive and neural sciences and reviewed two possible pictures of the relations between computation and implementation in the mechanistic hierarchy. On the one-hierarchy picture computational and implementational properties reside in the same level(s) of explanation. On the two-hierarchy picture computational and implementational properties reside in different computational and implementational hierarchies. We concluded that both pictures are possible regarding the reinforcement learning example, but that scientific practice does not align with the view that computational models are merely mechanistic sketches.
